In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Transformative Change in Western Thought: A History of Metamorphosis from Homer to Hollywood eds. by Ingo Gildenhard and Andrew ZissosBenjamin Eldon StevensIngo Gildenhard and Andrew Zissos, eds. Transformative Change in Western Thought: A History of Metamorphosis from Homer to Hollywood. Oxford: Legenda, 2013. xv + 522 pp. Cloth, $89.50.This volume represents a wide range of approaches to the topic of “metamorphosis.” The topic is obviously quite large; (...) in other hands it could be thought somewhat nebulous. To the credit of the contributors and the editors, although there are some attempts at definition, these are not developed for their own sake but are clearly focused on particular texts and contexts. As a result, the volume is exciting, enjoyable as well as serious, and therefore not only suggestive for future research but also set to be useful in teaching. I would happily assign relevant portions of it in courses on classical traditions and receptions. Whether in the classroom or elsewhere, it deserves to reach a large audience.The “volume narrates an alternative history of European culture that brings into view evolved and evolving continuities as well as sedimentations and ruptures” (xi–xii). To say that the essays do not exactly constitute a “history” would be to quibble: the twelve chapters as such do cover a great span of time, while a narrative frame is provided in the four introductory essays (one general, the other three divided amongst the parts). The editors anticipate that “the results are anything but conclusive and the coverage necessarily selective.” But this is a virtue: approaching its general topic via particular close studies, “this book will intrigue readers from various backgrounds to think further” about a wide range of questions indeed.In what follows I seek to give an impression of each chapter’s argument on its own terms and in some relation to the volume’s purpose. For reasons of space I do not direct much attention to the introductions, which, however, should be recognized not only as substantial historical surveys but also as successful evocations of how a study of “transformative change” in Western culture well serves to raise fascinating questions. [End Page 492]Part one focuses on “Antiquity and Archetypes.” In their own chapter, the editors argue that “Medea... is the first, and by far the most prominent, human agent of transformation” in Ovid’s Metamorphoses (89). Further, “the human metamorphic involves a series of steps that must be carefully performed... this amounts to a veritable ‘technology of transformation’ entailing special skills and knowledge.” Ovid’s Medea thus represents a change in genre, a metapoetic change as much as a change in metamorphosis itself. The editors conclude by emphasizing this “overall reading of the episode as an elaborate allegory of poetic competition” (123) which depends on “Medea’s special status as the metaliterary champion of a rival poetic vision” (122).Sonia Macrì develops a similar argument about discourse, seeking “key coordinates in ancient thought to do with the distinction, but also the porous boundaries and interfaces, between animate and inanimate nature and diverse kinds of knowledge, from the folkloristic to the scientific” (133). Macrì argues that, for example, “ancient lore about the lynx and its precious stone interrelates the world of nature... and the world of myth: various types of speculation... relate the peculiarities of the animal, its urine, and its fossilized end-product to the human sphere” (139). Macrì concludes with a point about discourse that is intriguingly similar to that made in the previous chapter: Ovid’s “myth-historical narrative of how our world came into being simultaneously draws on and trumps the discourses of natural history and paradoxography” (147).Questions of discourse and genre are raised as well by Manuel Baumbach, who argues that the figure of Proteus is a symbol “that involves poetic inspiration and textual production as much as textual reception” (153) and that ultimately assumes “the role of ‘generic memory’ (Gattungsgedächtnis) within the Greek epic tradition” (154). Having acquired in Homer “his self-reflective significance above all in his narrations,” Proteus “becomes a figure of metapoetic significance” in later authors (161). In Nonnus, Proteus becomes “a Muse of inspiration... (shrink)

A notable early result of David Makinson establishes that every monotone modal logic can be extended to LI, LV, or LF, and every antitone logic can be extended to LN, LV, or LF, where LI, LN, LV, and LF are logics axiomatized, respectively, by the schemas □α↔α, □α↔¬α, □α↔⊤, and □α↔⊥. We investigate logics that are both monotone and antitone (hereafter amphitone). There are exactly three: LV, LF, and the minimum amphitone logic AM axiomatized by the schema □α→□β. These logics, (...) along with LI, LN, and a wider class of “extensional” logics, bear close affinities to classical propositional logic. Characterizing those affinities reveals differences among several accounts of equivalence between logics. Some results about amphitone logics do not carry over when logics are construed as consequence or generalized (“multiple-conclusion”) consequence relations on languages that may lack some or all of the nonmodal connectives. We close by discussing these divergences and conditions under which our results do carry over. (shrink)

Lloyd Humberstone’s recently published Philosophical Applications of Modal Logic presents a number of new ideas in modal logic as well explication and critique of recent work of many others. We extend some of these ideas and answer some questions that are left open in the book.

This introduction to the Common Knowledge symposium titled “Comparative Relativism” outlines a variety of intellectual contexts where placing the unlikely companion terms comparison and relativism in conjunction offers analytical purchase. If comparison, in the most general sense, involves the investigation of discrete contexts in order to elucidate their similarities and differences, then relativism, as a tendency, stance, or working method, usually involves the assumption that contexts exhibit, or may exhibit, radically different, incomparable, or incommensurable traits. Comparative studies are required to (...) treat their objects as alike, at least in some crucial respects; relativism indicates the limits of this practice. Jensen argues that this seeming paradox is productive, as he moves across contexts, from Lévi-Strauss's analysis of comparison as an anthropological method to Peter Galison's history of physics, and on to the anthropological, philosophical, and historical examples offered in symposium contributions by Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Marilyn Strathern, and Isabelle Stengers. Comparative relativism is understood by some to imply that relativism comes in various kinds and that these have multiple uses, functions, and effects, varying widely in different personal, historical, and institutional contexts that can be compared and contrasted. Comparative relativism is taken by others to encourage a “comparison of comparisons,” in order to relativize what different peoples—say, Western academics and Amerindian shamans—compare things “for.” Jensen concludes that what is compared and relativized in this symposium are the methods of comparison and relativization themselves. He ventures that the contributors all hope that treating these terms in juxtaposition may allow for new configurations of inquiry. (shrink)

This is a remarkable piece of work—a detailed and imaginative survey of topics in propositional modal logic, broadly construed, that contains new conceptual insights and technical developments on e...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Double Exposure: Cutting Across Buddhist and Western DiscoursesSteven HeineDouble Exposure: Cutting Across Buddhist and Western Discourses. By Bernard Faure. Translated by Janet Lloyd. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. Pp. xiv + 174. Hardcover $49.50. Paper $21.95.In some ways, Double Exposure: Cutting Across Buddhist and Western Discourses by Bernard Faure seems quite different from other publications by this author, including several books that were also translated from the (...) French such as Visions of Power and Will to Orthodoxy, which have a specific focus on the practice of Chan or on gender issues in Buddhism. Double Exposure deals with broad, wide-ranging philosophical themes concerning Buddhist thought set in comparative contexts with Western intellectual history since the Enlightenment, especially continental European philosophy. Faure is well known from previous works for his extensive explorations of poststructural theory in examining historical and doctrinal buddhological issues. Clearly, however, this book was intended primarily not for Buddhist studies scholars but for an audience of French intellectuals and cultural critics, encompassing but more diverse than the academic community, who wish to understand how the discourse of Buddhism pertains to, yet remains distinct from, their own recent history of thought. Rather than citing a particular set of poststructural thinkers to illuminate Buddhism, Faure does the converse and uses Buddhism to make key points about the development of Western thought.At the same time, Double Exposure is consistent with and an extension of Faure's earlier books in that it tracks the role of the twofold or double in its various manifestations both in Buddhist thought and in methodological approaches to interpreting Buddhism. Faure is endlessly fascinated by and delights in exposing the fact that the Buddhist tradition, nwhich claims to espouse a standpoint of nondualism, invariably and inevitably divvies reality up into an endless series of polarities and paradoxes regarding the apparent oppositions or contradictions between the realms of nirvāṇa and samsāṃra, karmic causality and transcendence of karma, ultimate and mundane reality (or two levels of truth), and sudden and gradual enlightenment. He asserts: "The history of Buddhism... seems to be governed by what Bergson, in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, suggested calling the 'law of dichotomy,' a law which apparently brings about a realization, by a mere splitting, of tendencies which began by being two views, so to speak, of one and the same tendency" (p. 124). [End Page 178]In addition to Bergson, Faure cites classical notions like the Platonic division between the ideal form and the world of concrete forms, the two-faced Roman god Janus who rules over past and future, and the Manichaean split between good and evil. Faure also emphasizes more recent French thinkers and scholars, including Emile Beneviste, Nayla Farouki, Michel Foucault, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Henri Micheaux, among others, who in probing the "diabolical" sense of truth versus error, which are considered eternal contraries in Western thought, especially in Christianity, are useful for discussing parallels and differences with Buddhism.Double Exposure also discusses interpretive debates about whether Buddhism should be seen as epitomizing agnosticism versus mysticism, pragmatism versus supernaturalism, or rationalism versus mythology, as well as conflicts in using the method of psychology as opposed to anthropology and the impact of hidden, or not-so-hidden Orientalist and reverse Orientalist tendencies. Perhaps the best organized chapter in the book is "The Major Schools" (chapter 5), which offers a quick but insightful overview of early Buddhist realism, Yogācāra idealism, the Mādhyamika middle way, and Chan's compromise between immanence and transcendence. The most imaginative section is "External Thought" (chapter 8), which delves into a vast array of topics. These range from Tantric sexuality as a form of spiritual energy and Diderot's view of the perpetual shifting of ordinary thought to Zongmi's image of the bright pearl as a metaphor for sudden realization compared with Paul Claudel's own pearl metaphor in Conversations dans le Loir-et-Cher, which evokes a gradual path of self-understanding.I think Faure's main aim in all his many publications is to explore and expose the wedges, gaps, and inconsistencies, without making a judgment other than to underscore that what... (shrink)

In a recent paper1 which critically examines and rejects several suggestions that have been made for “bridging the gap” between Husserl’s phenomenology and neuroscience, Rick Grush concludes on a positive note: It should be obvious enough that while I have been highly critical of van Gelder, Varela and Lloyd, there is a clear sense in which the four of us are on the same team. We all believe that an important source of insights for the task of understanding of (...) mentality is what Lloyd describes as “analytic phenomenology,” even if we disagree about how to go about harvesting these insights. (shrink)

I should like to offer my greatest thanks to Paul Griffiths for providing the opportunity for this exchange, and to commentators Gillian Brown, Steven Fuller, Stefan Linquist, and Erika Milam for their generous and thought-provoking comments. I shall do my best in this space to respond to some of their concerns.

Observation by nonstandard observers has different implications for privacy than observation by ordinary human beings. This seemingly trivial point yields important insights about privacy. Searching for the characteristic that explains this difference reveals that privacy is importantly related to our interest in how others see us, and the derivative interest in controlling the information upon which others’ perceptions are based. This also casts light on the important relationships between privacy, autonomy, and the development of public personae.

Research Articles Eldon J. Eisenach, Social Philosophy and Policy, FirstView Article.

Universally acknowledged for his role in the development of modern liberalism, John Stuart Mill has fallen out of favor with today’s moral and political philosophers who fail to read beyond his works _Utilitarianism_ and_ On Liberty_. This collection of essays seeks to reestablish Mill as an important thinker for our time by stressing the moral basis of liberal democracy in a wide range of his writings These essays examine the full range of Mill’s work—including letters, diaries, and speeches—to show that (...) he was more interested in issues of character and leading a good life than in rules of obligation. They show how Mill sought to introduce historical consciousness and social responsibility into all aspects of his moral and political philosophy, and they contrast his vision of a liberal society with current theories of liberal democracy. The volume also includes three earlier studies that provide grounds for rethinking how the history of modern liberal philosophy might be written. Together, all of the contributions situate Mill at the boundary of the liberal-communitarian divide, revealing his reflections on the limits of democracy, the role of the family, and the relationship of economic resources and their distribution to self-development and sociality. This collection shows how Mill can light the way out of the darkening maze of rights and identity discourse in which liberal moral and political philosophy now finds itself. It provides an alternative to the Rawlsian model of liberalism and seeks to infuse academic disciplines and cultural communities with a morally responsible commitment to liberal democratic society. Contributors are Richard Ashcraft, Peter Berkowitz, Clark W. Bouton, Nicholas Capaldi, Janice Carlisle, Robert Devigne, Wendy Donner, Eldon Eisenach, Richard B. Friedman, A. D. Megill, Bernard Semmel, and Richard Vernon. (shrink)

Liberal political thought-from its origins in the seventeenth-century through today's rights discourse-is grounded in the ideal of the autonomous individual. As the theory holds, these individuals are 'born in freedom' from religious, political, social or economic obligations and then construct these systems through individual and collective choices. Over the past thirty years, however, this understanding of freedom has been challenged from a variety of perspectives. Eldon J. Eisenach has been at the forefront of that challenge, stressing the centrality of (...) religious elements and assumptions in liberal writings that many scholars suppressed or ignored. In Narrative Power and Liberal Truth Eisenach brings together eleven of his previously published essays to demonstrate that many 'postmodernist' ideas of persons and freedom are already present within the tradition of liberal political philosophy and that liberalism itself is more capacious of human experience and meanings than modern critiques allow. (shrink)

Consequentialism has trouble explaining why hypocrisy is a term of moral condem-nation, largely because hypocrites often try to deceive others about their own selfishness through the useof words or deeds which themselves have good consequences. We argue that consequentialist attempts to deal with the problem by separating the evaluation of agent and action, or by the directevaluation of dispositions, or by focusing on long-term consequences such as reliability and erosion of trust, all prove inadequate to the challenge. We go on (...) to argue, however, that a version of consequentialism which values the fulfilment of desires, rather than mental states, is able to explain why hypocrisy is generally wrong, and indeed can do so better than its Kantian rivals. (shrink)

Students of Mill's political theory know that he was both a political reformer and a social philosopher. An important part of Mill's life involved political struggles over the electoral franchise and schemes of parliamentary representation, the legal and social emancipation of women, land law and economic policy, and freedom of speech and the press. When turning to his best known writings such asOn Liberty, Considerations on Representative Government, Principles of Political EconomyandThe Subjection of Women, issues of reform intrude at almost (...) every point. Even his more philosophical writings—Utilitarianism, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's PhilosophyandSystem of Logic— can be seen as attacks on or supports for those theories of man and society which Mill sees as hindering or furthering ‘the improvement of mankind’. Moreover, Mill's subsidiary careers as a journalist, editor of theLondon and Westminster Reviewand member of parliament further demonstrate his commitment to political reform. (shrink)

The need of reason is not inspired by the quest for truth but by the quest for meaning. And truth and meaning are not the same. The basic fallacy, taking precedence over all specific metaphysical fallacies, is to interpret meaning on the model of truth. (Hanna Arendt, The Life of the Mind: Thinking)2 The problem of agency in liberal political thought begins when dictates of reason grounded in philosophical truth become separated from motivations premised on desires and appetites articulated in (...) moral psychology. In the writings of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill, political agency requires both reason and motive, and motive, in turn, requires narratives of meaning that enable and motivate us to act. These narratives incorporate elements of the sacred and these religious elements, in turn, become parts of their moral psychologies. Part I is a summary of the role of sacred narrative for human agency in Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill. In America, a sacred/national narrative became an essential part of Progressive political thought at the turn of the last century. Part II explores the construction of national narratives in Progressive political thought that were intended to discredit prevailing forms of constitutionalist and other static and abstract forms of rights talk. The decline of this narrative framework and the rise of fixed principles of moral neutrality in liberal public philosophy in America during the second half of the twentieth century had two effects: it downplayed the role of civic virtue and it submerged national narratives of substantive public purpose. This narrative absence runs parallel with the demise of progressive liberalism as a formative political force in America. Recently, American public intellectuals have sought to restore narrative and patriotism to principles of liberal-progressive reform. Part III concludes by returning to the moral psychology of liberalism, this time by contrasting John Rawls and Charles Taylor on human agency. (shrink)

Progressive intellectuals at the turn of the last century founded the modern American university, created its disciplines and edited the journals that codified their thoughts. They created the ligaments of the national administrative and regulatory state; they helped legitimate the creation of a national financial and industrial corporate economy. Through the writings of Lyman Abbott, Albion Small, and Simon Patten, three features of progressive thought are underlined: the primacy of a narrative, their hostility to “principled” or abstract-philosophical forms of political (...) and social thought, and their confidence that historical modes of social inquiry would produce “laws”? of progress that would guide practice and anchor values integrating self and society on a democratic basis. Five topics contain these animating features: national patriotism, the new industrial economy, a new democratic ethic, social Christianity, and their critique of the dominance of constitutional jurisprudence and law in American political institutions and practices. (shrink)

Habermas passa a atribuir, a partir de 1990, um papel central ao mundo da vida que, como fonte da racionalidade comunicativa, é capaz de se opor ao processo de dominação sistêmica e manter a autonomia dos indivíduos. O texto explicita os argumentos que levam Habermas a considerar a espontaneidade do mundo da vida como fonte que assegura a validade cognitiva e normativa das ações dos indivíduos em interação e avalia o potencial crítico desse posicionamento na educação. A ideia orientadora é (...) que o entendimento da vida escolar só pode ser atingido se levar em conta a forma de produção do mundo da vida dos atores que a compõem. (shrink)

For the second edition this popular collection on contemporary ethical issues has been expanded to nine sections. Abortion and euthanasia are now given expanded coverage, and there are new sections as well on assisted reproduction and commodification, and on ethics and the use of violence. The book is primarily composed of pieces by philosophers, chosen both for their intrinsic value and for their accessibility to students. But where relevant the collection also includes legal documents and non-philosophical writings that help to (...) set issues in context for Canadian students. In all, Ethical Issues now includes sixty-six selections, thirty-nine of which are new to this edition. The editor has also provided extensive introductory material and questions for discussion. (shrink)

Hypocrisy and privacy are commonly thought to be completely different, yet it turns out to be surprisingly difficult to distinguish them. We consider various ways in which they might be differentiated, especially the attempt to do so on the basis of their moral standing. We argue, by case and through discussion, that there is more moral ambiguity about each concept than generally acknowledged. Finally, we offer some additional speculations about the similarities and differences between the two, with a view to (...) aid moral discernment. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;In this thesis, I begin with some of the key assumptions of utilitarianism and argue that even in its own terms utilitarianism is in need of considerable revision. This is largely because its two central tenets come into conflict with each other in some cases. I argue that utilitarianism is in need of a fuller account of equality than it has traditionally employed, and that such an improved conception (...) of equality will lead the would-be utilitarian to drop the claim that all well-being must count morally. In particular, I argue that the fundamental step of morality might best be understood in terms of a right to equal consideration. However, a proper understanding of what this right entails leads one to a theory very much like utilitarianism. ;In Chapter II I attempt to put my utilitarian target in its most favourable light by considering which account of well-being is the most plausible as a thing which one might want to maximize as the basis of morality. Then, in Chapter III, I proceed to consider the possibility of a right-based moral theory. I examine the relationship between interests and rights, and argue that even if it is a necessary condition for the existence of rights that there be interests which they must protect, it is possible to have a right-based moral theory. This is made possible by the nature of the relationship between prudential value and moral value. I also argue that rights are particularly well suited to describe the importance of choice and autonomy in morality. Furthermore, I suggest that moral standing itself might best be seen in terms of possession of a waivable right. ;In Chapters IV and V, I set out the main argument that not all well-being can be allowed to count morally. In particular, I argue that enjoyment-producing preferences whose content is that others not be counted equally must be counted by utilitarianism but undermine that theory if it does try to count them. In the course of this criticism, I develop the sketch of an alternative but related theory which I call "right-based utilitarianism". In Chapter VI, I expand the description of this theory, and in Chapter VII I consider some of its implications and possible extensions, compared with standard forms of utilitarianism. Such a "right-based utilitarianism" is able to show utilitarianism the way out of at least some of its dilemmas while preserving that which gives utilitarianism its appeal. (shrink)